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MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIANISM AND 1HE POETICS OF 
1HE ENGLISH CORPUS CHRISTI DRAMA 
Theodore K. Lerud 
In an essay printed in the 1972 collection Medieval English Drama: 
Essays Critical and Contextual (Taylor and Nelson, eds.), Jerome 
Taylor argues for the dramatic unity of the Corpus Christi cycles by 
invoking the principles of Aristotle's Poetics: 
This history presents a unified development from clearly 
defined beginning, through complication and crisis, to 
clearly defined end, so that the total dramatic projection of 
this history has a unity borrowed from the object it imitates. 
(Taylor 154) 
While Taylor does not argue specifically for the influence of 
Aristotle on the Corpus Christi dramatists, the tell-tale phrases 
embedded in his essay ('object imitated,' 'classic stages of 'plot, m 'a 
serious action') nonetheless raise the interesting question of the 
possible influence of Aristotle on the dramatists, especially given 
what we know about the transmission of Aristotelian texts into the 
intellectual discourse of the West in the twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries. 
In opening for consideration the question of Aristotle's 
influence on medieval drama, we must address the issue on two 
levels. First, we must consider the probable or possible direct 
relationship between Aristotle's texts, including the logical texts of 
the Organon, the Physics, the Metaphysics, the Poetics, and De 
Anima, and the texts of the Corpus Christi dramatists. Second, and 
more important, in view of the way in which texts were copied and 
transmitted during the medieval period, we need to consider the 
transmission history of the texts and the likelihood, given that 
process, that they might have been encountered in an altered or 
synthesized form by a Corpus Christi dramatist. This issue can be 
studied by raw counting of available manuscripts, but perhaps more 
tellingly by noting the influence of key Aristotelian texts on 
authoritative texts more contemporary to the Corpus Christi 
dramatists. We can also invoke related texts which appear to 
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corroborate or mirror concerns expressed in more clearly 
Aristotelian texts. 
In general, such an investigation reveals that, while the 
Poetics appears to have available to medieval writers, it seems to 
have exercised little influence. While this fact is usually attributed 
to misreading and lack of interest, it might be more accurate to say 
that the medievals more correctly understood Aristotle as primarily 
a logician, and his Poetics as a relatively minor work, stemming from 
and subordinate to the principles set forth in the logical corpus. 
Even Averroes, whose "middle commentary," as translated by 
Hermannus in 1256, provided the Western medievals' main access 
to the Poetics, provided only one commen.tary on the Poetics, while 
he completed three each on the Posterior Analytics, the Physics, and 
the Metaphysics (Hardison 62). And Aquinas, the most well-known 
synthesizer and transmitter of Aristotle, never comments on it; yet 
he comments extensively on the Physics and Metaphysics (Pegis xlix). 
He also, in extensive commentaries and particularly in constructing 
his compelling model of human cognition in Part I, Questions 75-89, 
of the Summa Theologiae, seems singularly fascinated by the 
Aristotle of De Anima. Aristotle's emphases on the central role of 
sensibilia in human perception, and on the key position of the 
phantasms of the imagination in the operation of memory and 
understanding, become part of Aquinas' model. And in fact, it is 
this Aristotelian text, rather than the Poetics, that comes to provide 
a theoretical model for medieval drama. 
But before turning to a more detailed consideration of the 
importance of De Anima, let us consider in a bit more detail the 
fate of the Poetics in the Middle Ages, addressing in particular .two 
questions: 1) How was the Poetics understood in the Middle Ages? 
and 2) Why was it not a more compelling model for Aquinas and 
for the Corpus Christi and other dramatists? 
From the point of view of mere availability, we can point to 
.two translations of or commentaries on the Poetics which existed by 
the late thirteenth century. First, as noted above, Hermannus' Latin 
translation of Averroes' middle commentary on the Poetics was 
available from 1256. In fact, Hardison notes that no fewer than 
.twenty-three manuscripts of the translation survive, and that the 
translation was printed in 1481 (64). So this commentary did 
exercise some influence; however, we must keep in mind its 
apparently idiosyncratic emphases as will be discussed below. In 
addition, William of Moerbeke, whom Aquinas probably knew 
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during his time at Orvieto (1261-65) (Pegis xlviii), published a 
translation of the Poetics directly from the Greek in 1278. In fact, 
Pegis speculates that this meeting contributed to Aquinas' general 
interest in Aristotle as well as to William's interest in translating 
Aristotle from the Greek (xlviii). Yet the Poetics does not seem to 
have been anywhere near the center of that interest. Indeed, only 
two manuscripts of the translation survive, both from the thirteenth 
century, and it was not printed until 1953 (Hardison 64). Thus, the 
actual complete text of the Poetics, while it would have been 
available, though perhaps not easily accessible, to Aquinas and other 
medievals before its revitalization in cinquecento Italy, does not 
seem to have excited much interest. 
Taking Hermannus' popular Latin version of Averroes' 
commentary as an indicator, the concepts of the Poetics, with its 
generic classifications and its discussion of tragedy as the imitation 
of an action, seem to have been equally foreign to the Arab 
Averroes and the German monk Hermannus. 0. B. Hardison 
suggests that misreadings of two kinds run through the commentary 
and translation: 1) poetics is treated (like rhetoric) as a branch of 
logic; 2) poetry is understood as the art of praise and blame (63). 
In Averroes, poetry is analyzed in terms of its general device of 
comparison and its use of rhetorical tropes--simile, metaphor, 
analogy. In a typically medieval fashion, poetry is thus seen as the 
skillful use of figures. Further, poetry is understood as the art of 
praise and blame because it can thus be seen as a technique for 
moral instructions. Its object is understood to be the creation of 
virtuous and vicious characters who induce praise and blame from 
readers and thus provide models of proper and improper behavior. 
In this version, then, what poets do has little to do with the 
Aristotelian formulation of an imitation of an action; instead, they 
cleverly manipulate rhetorical figures to induce praise or blame and, 
accordingly, moral behavior. 
In fact, by considering the emphases of Hermannus' 
translation along with another thirteenth-century essay on poetry, 
the Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, we can illuminate 
thirteenth-century attitudes toward poetry and the Poetics and 
observe Hardison's "misreadings." 
Taylor notwithstanding, what is notably lacking in the 
medieval treatments of poetics is any emphasis on the object of 
imitation-the substance and structure of the action that is the basis 
for a poem. Further, there seems to be little distinction between 
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genres. Geoffrey, who claims a knowledge of 'artistic theory" as the 
basis of his judgments (21 ), spends most of his treatise (forty-five of 
seventy-eight pages, in the edition of the Pontifical Institute) on his 
section IV, which consists of exemplary 'Ornaments of Style.' This 
section consists of lists upon lists of tropes, beginning with 
metaphor, making for 'difficult' and 'easy' ornament. Other key 
sections deal with "Ordering the Material" and 'Amplifications and 
Abbreviation"; the treatise also contains short sections on "Memory" 
and "Delivery." No clear generic distinctions are made, with 
examples and models being taken indiscriminately from classical 
story, political oratory, and biblical material. Under the section on 
ordering the material, the examples of beginnings seem to suggest 
an assumed moral purpose for poetry: e.g.,, one might begin with a 
proverb, 'What is more desirable is more evanescent' (22), or an 
exemplum drawn from the end of the story: "Often the arrow learns 
to rebound on the archer; and the stroke, turned aside, to recoil on 
the striker' (23). In general, the emphasis is on ordering and 
'clothing' the matter (17), with no discussion of exactly what the 
appropriate matter, or 'object,' might be for a given effort or genre. 
Clearly then, as revealed in the works of Averroes and 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, the medieval conception of poetics, and of 
Aristotle's Poetics in particular, deviates significantly from our own. 
Indeed, Stephen Halliwell notes convincingly that the juxtaposition 
of poetics and rhetoric was not a purely medieval phenomenon, but 
may have stemmed from late Roman and Hellenistic attitudes. He 
points out that Aristotle's Poetics may not even have been widely 
known during the Alexandrine and Roman periods, and that Horace 
and Aristotle were seen by Hellenistic critics as similar in their 
concerns. Halliwell attributes this attitude to 'the domination 
acquired over literary criticism during the Hellenistic period by 
rhetoric" (289). Like the medievals, Hellenistic critics were removed 
from the cultural context of the Poetics,, with its admiration of 
Homeric epic and Athenian tragedy, and its sense of Platonic 
objections to poetry. 
Thus, it seems unlikely that the Poetics--especially 'our' 
modern Poetics-would have exercised any significant influence on 
the dramatists of Corpus Christi. However, it is nonetheless not 
accurate to say, as is often assumed, that, insofar as they had it 
available, the medievals warped or misunderstood the Poetics. 
Hardison, for example, speaks of 'the process of assimilating 
Aristotle by misinterpretation that continued throughout the Middle 
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Ages" (59). Halliwell, more recently, notes that "Hermannus' 
translation of Averroes, incorporating the misunderstandings that 
arose from study of an alien work at several removes from the 
original" (291 ), may have been regarded at Paris in the fourteenth 
century as a contribution to Aristotelian logic. The usual view is 
that with the printing of the Poetics at Venice in 1508 the true text 
was recovered from Byzantine libraries and more accurate readings, 
roughly similar to those of today, prevailed. The introduction to a 
more recent (1986) translation by Charles E. Butterworth of 
Averroes' commentary directly from the Arabic goes some way 
toward correcting the view that Averroes ( and presumably 
Hermannus) misunderstood the Poetics. 
According to Butterworth, whose English translation of 
Averroes' commentary on the Poetics is the first directly from the 
Arabic original, both Hermannus' Latin translation and Hardison 's 
English translation of the Latin are inadequate in the rendering of 
Arabic poetry and inexact about Averroes' purpose (ix). After 
working closely with the Arabic text, Butterworth provides intriguing 
explanations ofHardison's two central points: 1) that Averroes saw 
the Poetics as related to rhetoric and, ultimately, as a branch of 
logic; 2) that Averroes, as one interested in reforming Arabic 
poetry, was interested in the Poetics as a didactic or moral text, and 
failed to see the contradiction between his own ethical and logical 
approaches. 
On the first point, Butterworth notes interestingly that 
medieval commentators may not have been far wrong in placing the 
Poetics among Aristotle's logical works, since Aristotle himself may 
have regarded poetics as a part of logic. Like Halliwell, 
Butterworth sees Plato's dismissal of the poet, particularly in the 
passage in Book Ten of the Republic, as providing a context for 
Aristotle's Poetics. He goes on to state that Averroes' identification 
of poetry with the art of logic is "faithful to Aristotle's thought': 
Much of what [Aristotle) has to say about diction and 
delivery, as well as about character and thought, is 
developed more fully in the Rhetoric. Moreover, at one 
point, he even suggests that poetry is a kind of rhetoric. 
Since the opening line of the Rhetoric defines that art as 
being the antistrophe or counterpart of dialectic, it is fair 
to infer that Aristotle considers poetry to be part of logic. 
(14) 
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Butterworth further suggests that the "philosophic" perspective from 
which poetry is analyzed in the Poetics implies the superiority of 
philosophy to poetry. 
Second, Butterworth concedes that Averrroes is clearly 
interested in the moral ends to which the Poetics may be put. Like 
Halliwell, he notes that Averroes' apparently skewed emphasis here 
may be owing at least in part to his lack of knowledge of epic and 
tragedy, there being nothing like these important Greek genres in 
Arabic culture. Averroes would have encountered nothing like the 
Iliad or Oedipus Rex; thus it is not surprising that he draws his 
examples from Arabic lyric poetry rather than from epic or tragedy, 
the genres so important to Aristotle's conception of poetics. 
Averroes apparently understands tragedy and comedy as "eulogy" 
and "satire," the distinction between the two having to do with 
whether the poem focuses on praise or blame. However, 
Butterworth attributes Averroes' attitud<: more to the rank and 
importance he ascribes to poetry than to any serious 
misunderstanding of Aristotle's definitions of comedy and tragedy. 
Averroes' sense of the uses of eulogy and satire, though perhaps not 
truly Aristotelian, is related to "the pedagogic or political role he 
(Averroes) assigns the poet' {13). For Aristotle, poetry is concerned 
with the actions of good and bad individuals because it 'seeks to 
imitate human beings in action' (13) and therefore must enter the 
arena of character differentiation. In contrast, Averroes 'portrays 
poets as seeking to encourage some actions and discourage others'; 
he even 'qualifies the moral character of the poets according to 
whether they seek to imitate virtue or vice" (13). 
In this context, it is also important to remember William of 
Moerbeke's accurate translation of the Poetics from the Greek, 
completed around 1278-a translation usually mentioned and 
dismissed by historians of the Poetics. In view of its existence, how 
can we explain that it is only preserved in two manuscripts, and 
apparently failed to derail the popularity of Hermannus' translation 
of Averroes' commentary? A possibl" answer, hinted at by 
Butterworth, is that possession of the complete translation did not 
contradict the medievals' prevailing sense of the Poetics as a part of 
logic, with connections to rhetoric, and that, in fact, the medievals 
were truer to Aristotle's own sense of his work than were later 
readers. 
Indeed, the medieval view of Aristotle as, in the main, a 
logician seems accurate. Even in modern ,,ditions, it is clear that six 
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of his works, more than for any other subject area, deal with topics 
in logic. And Aristotle himself, in stating the use of his Topics, his 
treatise on proper reasoning, in Book I, notes that the treatise is 
useful because 'the possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us 
more easily to argue about the subject proposed .... It has a further 
use in relation to the principles used in the several sciences ... for 
dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the 
principles of all inquiries" (Barnes 168; emphasis mine).' If we 
master the methodology of the Topics, Aristotle continues, in a 
passage which suggests the relationship of logic to rhetoric, "we shall 
be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a 
position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and 
medicine and faculties of that kind." 
Similarly, in his Posterior Analytics Aristotle sets up the 
method of which rhetoric will be the counterpart and which will be 
followed in the inquiry into poetry. The assumption which opens 
the treatise is that 'all teaching and all intellectual learning come 
about from already existing knowledge" (114). Aristotle says that 
this applies to both inductive and deductive reasoning, adding 
parenthetically that rhetorical arguments persuade in the same way 
that intellectual learning occurs, "for they do so either through 
examples, which is induction, or through enthymemes, which is 
induction" (114). Thus it becomes clear why Aristotle opens his 
Rhetoric with the statement that 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of 
dialectic" (2152). Aristotle proceeds in the Posterior Analytics to 
discuss the way in which understanding must occur: it must "depend 
on things which are true and primitive and immediate and more 
familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion" (115); 
"Depending on things that are primitive is depending on appropriate 
principles; for I call the same thing primitive and a principle" (116). 
By the time we get to the Poetics, we can note that it bears 
all the signs of being an exercise in logic on the subject of poetry. 
Poetry is no doubt an interesting subject to choose for analysis, in 
view of Platonic objections to the poet such as those advanced in 
Book Ten of the Republic. What needs to be kept clearly in mind 
( and what has been too frequently ignored by modern critics) is that 
the Poetics is neither a defense nor a condemnation of poetry, nor 
is it a prescriptive treatise on how to write poetry or tragedy; it is 
quite simply an analysis which follows the method as set forth in the 
logical works-an analysis which in fact could be carried out by any 
student of Aristotle with a grasp of his method and a fair 
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acquaintance with contemporary poetry and tragedy. Thus, it opens 
by noting that it will consider both the genus and species of poetry, 
and suggests that the analysis will follow a particular "line of 
inquiry" (2316). Then, a=irding to the procedure of the Posterior 
Analytics, the analysis commences: "Let us follow the natural order 
and begin with first principles" (2316). What impresses about the 
Poetics is not its inspiration but the sense of completeness in its 
methodology and distinctions. 
In the twelfth century, John of Salisbury, in stating the 
prevailing medieval view of Aristotle as logician, only echoes 
Aristotle's own conception of the role of his logical treatises in his 
corpus. In Book III of his Metalogicon, he makes the case for 
Aristotle as logician, and for the study of his logical works as a 
necessary prologue to the study of his other works. According to 
John, the Categories is the essential work for the beginning student: 
Taking a student as, so to speak, a helpless and speechless 
infant in regard to logic, [ the Categories J instructs him in 
the ABCs of this science . . . . Aristotle prefaces his 
discussion by observations concerning equivocal, univocal, 
and derivative terms, for a knowledge of this distinction is 
essential for one who wishes to define, divide, and draw 
inferences. (Chap. 2, 150) 
Arguing against those who say that the Categories, because it is 
elementary, is useless, John states that no one can become a 
logician without studying the book. He summarizes (156-57) the 
method explicated in the work, concluding that it 
provides a most correct system of [scientific] research, and 
opens up a primary and evident highway for the perfection 
of knowledge. These seem to be the principal means of 
affording a complete knowledge of everything pertaining to 
the Peripatetic discipline, which is concerned with 
investigating the truth. 
Following his discussion of the Categories with a discussion 
of Aristotle's On Interpretation, John suggests that Aristotle regarded 
these books as introductory to the body of logic-not "of the art" 
(de arte) but "for the art" (ad artem) (171). The actual body of the 
art, to be pursued next, consists of the remaining Aristotelian logical 
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texts: the Topics, the Analytics, and the Refutations. Specifically, 
John notes that one who masters the body of the art of logic will be 
prepared for inquiry in all branches of learning: 
If the last three are thoroughly mastered, and the habit of 
employing them is firmly fixed by practice and exercise, 
then one who applies them in demonstration, dialectic, or 
sophistry will have a wide command of invention and 
judgment in every branch of learning. (171) 
Not only is John of Salisbury echoing the curricular structure under 
which he learned, but he expresses the prevailing view of Aristotle 
as primarily a logician. Thus it is not surprising that the Poetics and 
the Rhetoric would be seen as subordinate to the logical treatises. 
Post-Renaissance conceptions of the Poetics have been 
dominated by two misperceptions, one now fairly well alleviated and 
the other not. First, particularly under the influence of neo-classical 
theorists, the Poetics came to be viewed as a prescriptive text on 
play writing. Samuel Johnson's critique of the idea of the three 
unities (actually not even in the Poetics) in his "Preface to 
Shakespeare" is an example of a reaction against such prescriptive 
notions, many of which are thought to be based on the Poetics. And 
certainly we can now congratulate ourselves on having moved 
beyond that erroneous view of the Poetics. However, a second 
misconception remains in the exaggerated sense we have of the 
importance of the Poetics in the overall corpus of Aristotle's work. 
It is as a result of this misconception that we accuse the medievals 
of misreading or distorting the Poetics; yet it is precisely here that 
the medieval view can serve as a corrective to our own. While it 
may be true that they showed more apparent interest in a 
fragmentary commentary on the Poetics than in an available 
accurate translation from the Greek, it appears that this may have 
been the result of conscious priorities on their part rather than on 
misreading. They understood the properly subordinate role of the 
Poetics in the larger corpus of Aristotle's works as an exercise in 
logic. 
This attitude that poetic criticism is relatively unimportant 
correlates generally with the attitude reflected in some twelfth-
century writings on the structure of knowledge. Hugh of St. Victor's 
Didascalicon provides an interesting case study for our purposes 
because it places both poetry and "theatrics" in a larger structure of 
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human knowledge and learning. Theatrics is placed not under the 
theoretical (theology, mathematics, physics) or even the practical 
( ethical, economic, political) sciences, but among the mechanical 
sciences, alongside such arts as hunting and fabric making. Logic, 
the fourth and final part of philosophy (in addition to the three 
sciences listed above), includes grammar, which subsumes such 
things as 'tropes, prose composition, verse composition, fables, and 
histories' (80) in Hugh's structure. In addition, Hugh warns that 
poetry belongs to the second sort of writing, appendages to the arts, 
which rarely treats of serious matters and is 'only tangential to 
philosophy' (88). 
Interestingly, when Hugh of St. Victor speaks of 'theatrics' 
as one of the seven mechanical arts, he speaks of it in the past 
tense-i.e., 'the theater, to which the people once used to gather for 
the performance' (79; emphasis mine). Contrary to some current 
views of the medieval sense of theater, Hugh seems to have a clear 
enough sense of the way in which classical drama was performed, 
distinguishing between recitals of epics and actual drama: 
In the theater, epics were presented either by recitals or by 
acting out dramatic roles or using masks or puppets .... 
(79) 
The significant thing here seems to be not a failed understanding of 
theater, but a sense of theater as something past. It does not 
appear (despite the footnote in Taylor's edition) that Hugh 
associates theater with the liturgical drama that was certainly 
flourishing by the 1120s. Theater is something past; the liturgical 
drama is something qualitatively other. 
If the Poetics was read differently than it is now, and does 
not prove to be a central text in illuminating medieval drama, then 
where are we to look for a theory or 'poetics' of medieval drama? 
Based on the notion, appearing in numerous fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century texts, that drama is to be conceived as an image; 
I would argue that it is to the De Anima, rather than to the Poetics, 
that we might most fruitfully look for an understanding, indeed a 
'poetics' of medieval drama. For medieval drama, especially the 
Corpus Christi drama, was seen primarily not as theater or as 
poetry, but as a storehouse, or, in Aquinas' word, a thesaurus of 
images to move the mind of the auditor to spiritual understanding. 
The plays were, in the sense which Mary Carruthers has described 
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in The Medieval Book of Memory, "copious" images, retained 
individually and collectively in the mind to be meditated upon and 
interpreted by the members of the community (see Carruthers 26-7, 
181-83). 
In the first place, it is clear that De Anima is a much more 
significant text in general for medieval commentators than the 
Poetics. Averroes comments on it in developing a formidable theory 
of intellect, and Emile Brehier lists its third book as one of the texts 
"in the foreground" in the Arab interpretation of Greek philosophy 
(Brehier 92, 100; Copleston 206-07). And Aquinas, who was very 
influential in creating the conception of the human soul that made 
the Corpus Christi plays possible, commented extensively on De 
Anima. Indeed, his conception of human cognition as set forth in 
Questions 75-89, Part 1, of the Summa is based heavily on the 
model of Aristotle's De Anima. Thus, Aristotle sets forth in De 
Anima the model which provides a basis for later understanding and 
defense of the efficacy of both images and drama. 
Aristotle begins by distinguishing his view of the soul from 
those of his predecessors, which he initially identifies as collectively 
based too exclusively on two erroneous principles: movement and 
sensation (McKeon 160). He further sets himself apart from those 
who define the soul as composed of elements or of body in some 
form (175-76). His own definition, rather than viewing soul as some 
subtle form of matter, characterizes soul as "a substance in the 
sense of a form of a natural body having life potentially within it" 
(182); the "essential whatness" of an organized body, possessed 
potentially of life (182). Soul is further identified with 
actuality-the "first grade of actuality" (182)-as against the 
potentially of matter. 
Having defined the soul in this general way, Aristotle goes 
on to indentify and characterize its psychic powers, which he says 
are possessed variously by different living things. At this point in 
his explication (Book II, Chap. III), Aristotle identifies five psychic 
powers in the soul (and Aquinas follows him in this in S.T. 1: 78): 
the nutritive, appetitive, sensory, locomotive, and thinking powers 
(187). We learn that plants possess only the nutritive power, which 
is characterized by growth and decay, while it is the possession of 
the sensory power that distinguishes animals from plants. Further, 
that which possesses sensory powers also possesses appetite, for 
appetite is desire of that which is perceived as pleasant. 
It is here, in the course of Aristotle's discussion of the 
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nutritive power, that we encounter the teleological conception so 
important to the medieval synthesizers of Aristotle: reproduction 
is characterized as 
the most natural act . . . the production of another like 
itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in 
order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the 
eternal and divine. That is the goal toward which all things 
strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their 
nature renders possible. (190) 
Similarly, Aristotle states later, in discussing sensation, that "Nature 
does nothing in vain. For all things that exist by Nature are means 
to an end, or will be concomitants of means to an end" (242). This 
notion of an end or plan in nature is readily assimilated in the 
Providential design of Aquinas and other medieval commentators on 
Aristotle. 
Aristotle next proceeds to discuss more extensively each of 
the psychic powers, though not in the precise order in which he has 
laid them out. He discusses the nutritive, sensory, and thinking 
powers in order, then proceeds to the powers of local movement 
and appetite. For our purposes, it is important to note that 
imagination (identified at one point in Book III (236] as one of the 
four parts of soul) plays a key, linking role in both these discussions. 
Imagination first appears as a link between sensation and 
thinking. Aristotle devotes significant space in Book III, Chap. III, 
to its discussion, noting that "thinking is different from perceiving 
and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement: we must 
therefore first mark off the sphere of imagination and then speak 
of judgement" (224). Although in forming opinions, we cannot 
escape the alternative of falsehood or truth, "imagining lies within 
our power whenever we wish." Thus, imagining is not the same as 
making a judgment-as Aristotle argues by evoking the use of 
mnemonics. Basic to our discussion here and to the defense of 
corporeal images later in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is 
Aristotle's assertion that "to the thinking soul images serve as if they 
were contents of perception. . .. That is why the soul never thinks 
wulwut an image" (233; emphasis mine). 
Central to Aristotle's conception is the idea that the soul, 
both in perceiving (sensing) and in thinking, must be potentially 
identical in character to the object perceived or thought without 
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being that object. Thus 'all sense perception is a process of being 
potentially such as its object is actually' (213); similarly, in the 
sphere of thinking, 'the thinking part of the soul must be, while 
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object .... Mind 
must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible' 
{227). Mind, in fact, can scarcely be said to exist apart from its 
activity of thinking: 
[M)ind is in a sense whatever is thinkable, though actually 
it is nothing until it has thought. What it thinks must be in 
it just as characters may be said to be on a writing tablet on 
which as yet nothing actually stands written; this is exactly 
what happens in the mind. (229-30) 
When the sensible objects are gone, imaginings continue to exist in 
the sense organs; images thus form the link that allows thinking and 
understanding to proceed: 
[T)he faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the 
images. . . . [S)ometimes by means of the images or 
thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, 
it calculates and deliberates what is to come by reference to 
what is present. (234) 
Aristotle ends this section (Book III, Chap. 8) by reaffirming the 
importance of sense, and accordingly of images, to all 
understanding: 
(1) [N)o one can learn of understanding anything in 
the absence of sense, and 
(2) when the mind is actively aware of 
anything it is necessarily aware of it along 
with an image .... (235) 
Just as the imagination provides a key link in cognitive 
understanding, so is it a central cog in the movement of the will. In 
his discussion of local movement, Aristotle identifies appetite and 
mind as the sources of movement; however, appetite is the ultimate 
source, since 'that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of 
mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is 
the beginning of the action' (238). Imagination, when it originates 
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movement, also involves appetite. Furthering his discussion of the 
relationship of imagination to appetite and motion, Aristotle states 
that 'inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of 
self-movement; it is not capable of appetite without possessing 
imagination' (240). Imagination may be distinguished as either 
calculative or sensitive, with calculative alone requiring synthetic 
ability-the ability 'to make a unity out of several images" (241). 
Imagination is important, then, in providing that which moves the 
appetite. 
Thus, in the spheres both of understanding and of will and 
desire, imagination has a key linking function. The key to the 
model lies in Aristotle's conclusion that "thinking, both speculative 
and practical, is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving' (McKeon 
223). Thus Aristotle, like Albertus Magnus and Aquinas after him, 
roots thinking, even speculative understanding, firmly in the sensory 
realm of the soul. And the tie between S<msing or perceiving and 
thinking is imagination-while different from either of these, it links 
them in an important way. For, as Aristotle notes, imagination, the 
basis of thought, 'must be a movement resulting from an actual 
exercise of a power of sense' (227). At one point, in a passage 
which could suggest a concept of theater as memory image, he 
specifically associates imagination with mnemonics: 
[I]magination lies within our power whenever we wish ( e.g., 
we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by 
the use of mental images) .... • {224) 
These images then form the basis of judgment or understanding. 
And, as we have seen, in a statement of Aristotle's echoed by 
Aquinas, to the thinking soul, images serve as the contents of 
perception, such that 'the soul never thinks without an image' 
(233). Through the synthesis of Aquinas and later medieval 
commentators, this role for images was transferred to the 
conception and defense of the images that were the Corpus Christi 
drama. Aquinas, drawing heavily on De Anima in the account of 
human cognition given in Part I, Questions 75-89 of the Summa 
Theologiae, sets up a context for a theory and defense of plays in the 
later Middle Ages. Aquinas' interest in De Anima is clear: it was 
among the works of Aristotle on which he wrote commentaries and 
it is also treated in his Disputed Questions (Pegis xlix-1 ). And he 
refers repeatedly to Aristotle, calling him simply 'the Philosopher,' 
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in his section on the soul in the Summa: for example, Pegis records 
no fewer than fourteen direct references to De Anitna in the four 
articles of Question 78 on the powers of the soul and twenty-nine 
in the thirteen articles of Question 79 on the soul's intellectual 
powers. 
Like Aristotle, Aquinas views the imagination as an 
important link between the sensitive and the intellectual powers of 
the soul. Though the soul will have a new mode of understanding 
after its separation from the body, inasmuch as the soul is linked to 
the body, the image, or phantasm, is vital for understanding: 
For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm, and 
there is no phantasm without the body, as the Philosopher 
says. (Pegis la: 75: 6; 691) 
As noted above, in Question 78, Aquinas explicitly follows 'the 
Philosopher' in designating the five powers of the soul as 'the 
vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the 
intellectual' (la: 78: 1; 734). Then in his explication of the sensitive 
powers in article 4, he distinguishes between the five external senses 
and the five internal sense powers. Among the five internal powers 
are fantasy, imagination, and the memorative power. Thus, as with 
Aristotle and Albertus Magnus, imagination and memory are placed 
in the realm of the sensitive. 
After discussing the external senses and establishing sight 
as the superior sense ( a quality often cited by those defending 
medieval drama), Aquinas moves on to treat the interior sensitive 
powers. In a process of increasing abstraction, the common sense 
receives the forms derived from sensibilia, and these forms are 
retained or conserved by the fantasy or imagination: 
(F)antasy or imagination is, as it were, a treasure-store 
[thesaurus) of forms received through the senses. 
(Blackfriars la: 78: 4; 138-9) 
Such images are vital to understanding, since, at the next level of 
abstraction, in the realm of the intellectual powers, the agent 
intellect, through participation in the Divine intellect, 'is able to 
illumine its own images (phantasmata illustrare )' (Blackfriars la: 79: 
4; 160-1). Only through the presence of images can understanding 
occur. 
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As contemporary commentators, and no doubt the 
dramatists themselves, realized, the Corpus Christi plays can be seen 
as just such treasure-stores, or thesauri, of images vital to spiritual 
understanding. Both the Expositor or Doctor characters who 
frequently appear and the characters themselves, as they illumine 
their own significance, mirror the role of the agent intellect in 
moving spectators to abstract the significance of the dramatic 
images. The plays are defended by one contemporary as quick 
images: 
[B)etere they ben holden in mennus minde and oftere 
rehersid by the pleyinge of hem than by the peintinge, for 
this is a deed bok, and tother a qu[i)ck. (Davidson, 
"Treatise" II. 216-19) 
The plays, as "rememoratijf signes," exist for the medieval 
audience as externalized quick images designed to move them 
toward spiritual understanding. Apparently, if we are to trust the 
account of Hugh of St. Victor, the liturgical drama, at least, was not 
even viewed as theater: rather, theater was a thing of the past. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the concepts of the Poetics were not 
current in the late Middle Ages; it is to Aristotle's De Anima and its 
transmission, rather than to his Poetics, that we must look for 
anything like a real "poetics" of medieval drama. 
Elmhurst College 
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Notes 
1. References to Aristotle's works are taken for the most part 
from the edition of Jonathan Barnes; however, the 
references to De Anima in the latter part of the paper are 
taken from Richard McKeon's fine translation. 
2. For example, the Wycliffite author of the fifteenth-century 
'tretise ofmiraclis pleyinge' (ed. Davidson) speaks of plays 
as similar in kind to painted images (11. 211-219), and 
Reginald Pecock, contemporary Bishop of Chichester, 
speaks of a 'quyk man ... sett in a play to be hangid nakid 
on a cros" as an even truer "ymage" of Christ than a "stok 
or a stoon graued' (p. 221 ). 
3. References to the Summa show Part, Question, and Article, 
with the page number(s) in the appropriate edition 
following the semicolon. Latin references to Aquinas, with 
their corresponding English translations, are taken from the 
Blackfriars edition (London 1970). 
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